The two essays brought together in this volume are born from the conviction that recent discussions of the foundations of history and science of man cannot be fully understood without reference to their historical and philosophical background. A careful examination of the methodological assumptions of any given discipline is an essential part of its development. Yet the problem has been ignored, for the most part, by historians and social scientists alike until very recently. They have been inclined to confine themselves (...) to the refinement of research techniques and to leave the question of the methodological and theoretical foundations of history and the social sciences entirely to the philosopher. It is primarily with this question that this book is concerned. Thus it is a study of history as well as a study of philosophy of science. (shrink)

It is argued that the so‐called principles of “strong centering” and “weak centering” central to the traditional Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals are both fallacious. A foundation for an alternative semantics without these prinsciples is outlined. The core idea is that the statistically normal worlds – rather than those worlds most qualitatively similar to the actual world – should serve as the semantical fulcrum.

In his ‘Gundersen on Counterfactuals and Tracking’ (Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy: 2005), Joshua Smith presents some very interesting points of criticism relating to my ‘Outline of a New Semantic for Counterfactuals’ (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 2004). In the following I'll do three things. I will briefly summarise the central theses from that paper and sketch the arguments that I take to support these theses. Then I will discuss Smith's objections; identify some points of agreement – but also some (...) points of disagreements – and try to shed some more light on certain central views of mine that might otherwise give rise to objections akin to those offered by Smith. Finally I will pursue a bit further a line of enquiry taken up by Smith. The central question here is to which extent, and why, tracking (and safety) theories of knowledge are vulnerable to Gettier cases. (shrink)

Gettier's reminder that knowledge cannot be identified with justified true belief started a heated debate about what knowledge really is.

We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.

In The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 , Alexander Bird raises an objection against the conditional analysis of dispositions: where an ‘antidote’ is present all the supposed conditions for manifestation of a disposition are fulfilled but the manifestation does not occur. But Bird’s argument suffers from equivocation. If we spell out properly whether the disposition's conditions are to include the presence of the antidote or not, the apparent counter‐examples disappear. So his examples do not undermine the conditional analysis of dispositions; they show (...) merely that we need to be careful about describing the examples consistently. (shrink)

You've just read the first sentence of this paper. Would you have read it if some butterfly in Brazil had had some extra nectar for breakfast? You probably think so. But this trivial observation apparently has very dramatic consequences. For instance, it seems to imply that you would have read that very sentence even if someone had offered you $1.000.000 not to do so. This paper is about what thus looks like a paradox in that a counterintuitive conclusion can seemingly (...) be derived from plausible premises and assumptions. The key is to recognise that ‘you would have read the sentence if the butterfly had feasted’ admits of distinct readings: one on which it is false, which is the traditional counterfactual implying causal relevance, and another on which it is true, which we call an irrelevant semifactual. While a fully satisfactory solution would need to develop and defend a semantic analysis of such conditional sentences, our modest aim is merely to sketch how the paradox might be solved. The underpinning theoretical work is for a different paper. (shrink)

We are living in a world which is severely crisis-ridden and faces some major challenges. The fact that we are currently facing a genuine global pandemic brings about even more uncertainty. The social and political institutions, which emerged and consolidated during the 20th century, and which created stability, have become fragile. The young generation born in the 1990s and onwards have experienced 9/11 and the ‘war against terrorism’, the financial crisis of 2008, changes to climate, environmental degradation, and most recently (...) the COVID-19 pandemic. The generation born between 1960 and 1990 have had the same experiences along with severe economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the Cold War. Some of these challenges are in different ways intertwined with capitalism and its crises, while others are linked to the rapid development of new technologies, in particular innovations within communication and information technologies. This introduction lists the most important grand challenges facing the world as they have emerged more recently. The five articles following this introduction address some of these challenges, with particular attention to the problems of capitalism and democracy and the relation between these two areas. Most authors agree that climate change and the destruction of the environment are the biggest and most pertinent problems to address, but it is their stance that we can only meet these challenges if democracy is functioning well. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this (...) view is adopted. (shrink)

Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” (...) as Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

Bu metnin gayesi, dil felsefesi, mantık ve ontoloji alanlarında ortak olarak karşılaşılan boş adlar problemini ele almaktır. Metinde, çağdaş semantik kuramlarının ve dil felsefesinin ortaya çıkışında önemli rolü olan J. S. Mill’in özel adlar üzerine düşüncelerinden başlanarak, analitik felsefenin temelini atan, köşe taşları diyebileceğimiz G. Frege ve B. Russell’ın semantik kuramlarına değinilecektir. Daha sonra, kendi dil felsefesi pozisyonunu bu iki isimin eleştirisi üzerinden kurgulayan S. Kripke’nin, bu isimlere karşı olan argümanları incelenecektir. Metinde, bu incelemeyi gerçekleştirdikten sonra, S. Kripke ve B. (...) Russell’ın dil felsefesinde savundukları pozisyonlar ile onların ortaya koydukları mantık modellerinin arasındaki ilişki ele alınacaktır. Nihai olarak, dil felsefesi, mantık ve ontolojinin sınırlarının ne kadar iç içe geçmiş olduğu, ismi geçen filozofların dil felsefesindeki kuramlarının ontolojik çıktıları incelenerek ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

18. yüzyıl, estetik kuramları açısından felsefe tarihinde daha önce görülmemiş ölçüde verimli bir dönemdir. Bu dönemde oluşturulan estetik kuramları, 18. yüzyılda epistemoloji, yöntem, ontoloji ve insan doğası üzerine yapılan tartışmaları doğrudan yansıtır. İlk estetik kuramlarını incelediğimizde, kuramların kendilerinden beslendiği iki ana hatla karşılaşırız. Bunlardan ilki kartezyen felsefenin estetikteki karşılığı olan nesne merkezli estetik, diğeri ise Lockeçu empirizmin estetikteki karşılığı olan özne merkezli estetiktir. Jean-Baptiste Du Bos, 18. yüzyılın hemen başlarında “Şiir ve Resim Üzerine Eleştirel Düşünceler” adlı çalışmasında nesne merkezli felsefenin (...) eleştirisini yaparak özne merkezli estetiği kurmuştur. Du Bos estetik soruşturmanın odağına özneyi yerleştirmiş, sanatı ve estetik deneyimi öznenin bilişsel yetilerinden, duygularından ve psikolojisinden hareketle tanımlamıştır. Eleştirel Düşünceler yalnızca bir estetik kuramı değil, aynı zamanda bir sanat tarihi, sanat sosyolojisi ve sanat psikolojisi çalışmasıdır. Çalışma farklı sanat türlerinin tarihsel gelişimlerini inceler ve bu türlerin yüzyıllar içinde nasıl evrildiğine bakar. Bunun yanında, coğrafi koşulların ve kültürel normların sanat kuramlarına etkisini inceler. Daha önce görülmemiş ölçüde bir kapsama sahip olan Eleştirel Düşünceler, estetiğin bağımsız bir disiplin olarak kurulmasında belki de en önemli rolü oynamış, 18. yüzyılda estetik alanında yazan tüm düşünürleri etkilemiştir. Bu makale, Eleştirel Düşünceler’de geliştirilen estetik kuramının ana hatlarını inceleyerek Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’nun modern estetiğe yaptığı katkıyı ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

In a recent article, Lars Bo Gundersen has suggested a new semantics for counterfactuals (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 1-20, 2004). The new semantics gives up on the idea that the actual world must be at the center of world orderings. Instead, statistically normal worlds are at the center. Part of the motivation for this idea is that a very influential account of knowledge, so-called ‘tracking’ accounts, seem right, but suffer serious problems with more traditional semantics for counterfactuals. Gundersen's semantics, (...) if correct, helps tracking accounts with certain problems, but leads to new problems that seem intractable. So while Gundersen's semantics might be correct, those who endorse tracking accounts of knowledge should be loath to endorse it. (shrink)

Throughout the history of social thought, there has been a constant battle over the true nature of society, and the best way to understand and explain it. This volume covers the development of methodological individualism, including the individualist theory of society from Greek antiquity to modern social science. It is a comprehensive and systematic treatment of methodological individualism in all its manifestations.

Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...) groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents. (shrink)

Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the (...) fundamental questions concerning the nature of intrinsic value are treated in depth and from a variety of viewpoints. These questions include how to understand the concept of intrinsic value, what sorts of things can have intrinsic value, and how to compute intrinsic value. The editors have added an introduction that ties these questions together and places the contributions in context, and they have also provided an extensive bibliography. The result is a comprehensive, balanced, and detailed picture of current thinking about intrinsic value, one that provides an indispensable backdrop against which future writings on the topic may be assessed. (shrink)

The attempt to critique the profession of clinical ethics consultation by establishing the impossibility of ethics expertise has been a red herring. Decisions made in clinical ethics cases are almost never based purely on moral judgments. Instead, they are all-things-considered judgments that involve determining how to balance other values as well. A standard of justified decision-making in this context would enable us to identify experts who could achieve these standards more often than others, and thus provide a basis for expertise (...) in clinical ethics consultation. This expertise relies in part on what Richard Zaner calls the “expert knowledge of ethical phenomena”. (shrink)

I november 2020 stod statsminister Mette Frederiksen på en gård i Jylland og kneb en tåre foran den forsamlede presse. Hun havde netop besøgt to generationer af minkfarmere, far og søn, hvis levebrød hun selv lige havde besluttet at slå ned. Var det kynisme eller reelle følelser, der var på spil? Tog statsministeren personligt ansvar for sin egen, svære beslutning, eller var hun en hykler? I denne videnskabeligt funderede debatbog sætter Silas F. Harrebye vores allesammens hykleri under lup. Han skelner (...) mellem forskellige former for hykleri og undersøger, hvad det gør ved demokratiet, at vi ofte er mere optagede af at anklage end at forstå hinanden. Bogen viser, hvorfor vi har brug for flere nuancer i debatten, hvis der skal være plads til politiske visioner og personlig udvikling. Bogen indeholder dybdegående interviews med 8 kendte politikere og meningsdannere som selv har været igennem deciderede shitstorms og anklager om hykleri: Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Pelle Dragsted, Carolina Magdalene Maier, Morten Messerschmidt, Tim Whyte, Rasmus Willig, Anders Gadegaard og Lea Korsgaard. De bliver alle udfordret til at reflektere over både eget og andres hykleri. Derudover præsenterer bogen resultaterne fra en omfattende befolkningsundersøgelse lavet i forbindelse med bogen. Ved hjælp af overraskende teoretiske vinkler og fortolkninger formulerer Silas F. Harrebye et forsvar for hykleriet, som han mener er uundgåeligt og ligefrem kan være politisk produktivt. Som han skriver:?hellere hyklerisk idealist end konsekvent kyniker.? Bogen er skrevet til borgere og fagfolk, der interesserer sig for demokrati, politik og samfund. Den rummer en masse inspiration til at reflektere over de svære valg i livet og blive det, forfatteren kalder?den gode hykler?. Bogen kan oplagt bruges som supplerende litteratur på universiteter og højskoler inden for fx samfundsfag, filosofi og medievidenskab. (shrink)

“Applied philosophy” is used to refer to different things. I distinguish between seven different conceptions of applied philosophy – to wit, the relevance, specificity, practical, activist, methodological, empirical facts, and audience conceptions; show how the different conceptions are related; and point to various problems with or challenges to some of the conceptions. While applied philosophy has become a very active field in philosophy since 1970, many associate applied philosophy with applied ethics only. I contend that, as the variety of contributions (...) to this Companion shows and as each of the seven conceptions identified in this chapter implies, applied philosophy is much more than applied ethics. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 224 Seiten: 269-293.

The Gricean paradigm in pragmatics has recently been attacked for its alleged lack of explanatory import, based on the claim that it does not seek accounts of how utterance interpretation actually works, but merely of how it might work. This article rebuts this line of attack by offering a clear and detailed account of the explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics according to which the latter aims for rationalizing explanations of utterance interpretation. It is shown that, on this view, Gricean pragmatics (...) seeks psychological explanations of utterance interpretation that are “cognitively real” in a perfectly clear and robust sense. (shrink)

Background The legitimacy of conscientious objection to abortion continues to fuel heated debate in Italy. In two recent decisions, the European Committee for Social Rights underlined that conscientious objection places safe, legal, and accessible care and services out of reach for most Italian women and that the measures that Italy has adopted to guarantee free access to abortion services are inadequate. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health states that current Italian legislation, if appropriately applied, accommodates both the right to conscientious objection (...) and the right to voluntary abortion. Main body One empirical argument used to demonstrate that conscientious objection does not create barriers to abortion is the “no correlation” argument, which the Italian Committee for Bioethics employed to demonstrate that no association exists between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion in Italy and to support the weak form of conventional comprise adopted by the Italian legislation to balance the conflict between women’ autonomy and healthcare professionals’ moral integrity. Conversely, we showed how the “no correlation” argument fails to demonstrate the absence of a relationship between the number of conscientious objectors and waiting times for voluntary abortion, and that the limitations of the “no correlation” argument itself demonstrate how it is still difficult to describe the real effect of conscientious objection on the access to abortion services and to evaluate the suitability of conventional compromise to effectively balance conflicting moral principles. Conclusion Further studies are needed to better describe the relationship between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion. If new evidence would show that the increasing proportion of objectors does undermine the efficacy of the Italian law and the right of a woman to freely obtain a voluntary abortion, new ways will need to be found to address the conflict between moral principles and restrict the protection accorded to the principle of moral integrity. This would inevitably imply the need to constrain and to redefine the terms and conditions for claiming conscientious objection. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. (...) As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity. (shrink)

Heidegger has been blamed for being obsolete, irrelevant, ignorant and even dangerous in relation to contemporary philosophy of technology. Based on mainly two texts from Heidegger’s post-war production, “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Only a God can Save Us”, this commentary to Don Ihde’s article tries to show how Heidegger actually makes sense to philosophy of technology. The sheer fact that many postmodern thinkers, among those Don Ihde, are constantly ‘measuring’ their line of thoughts and use of concepts against Heidegger’s (...) original thinking is proof of this relevance. I think that Heidegger, despite his despicable political and moral convictions, is needed when it comes to a critique and understanding of contemporary technological innovation and development in relation to what it means to be human. Most important is to stress that Heidegger was not a technodystopian, which a thorough reading of the two selected texts clearly shows. On the contrary, Heidegger points at the existential dialectical essence in technology, which means that both damnation and redemption can be mediated by technology. (shrink)

Summary We have considered complete consistent systems in the first‐oder predicate calculus with identity, and have studied the set of the models of such a system by means of the maximal consistent condition‐sets associated with the system. The results may be summarized thus: (a) A complete consistent system is no‐categorical (= categorical in the denumerable domain) if and only if for every n, the number of different conditions in n variables is finite (T10). (b) If a complete consistent system has (...) a model M with finite character (i.e. a model M such that every maximal consistent condition‐set satisfied in M has a finite basis), then this model M is uniquely characterized by the property that every other model is an arithmetic extension of M (T 5). (c) Every complete consistent system, which has only a denumerable number of different associated maximal consistent condition‐sets, has a model with finite character (T8). (shrink)

This article demonstrates the broad applicability of the concept of symbol in human communication, beyond but including verbal language. The starting point is Charles Sanders Peirce’s understanding of symbolicity as signification grounded on habits. The goal is to be able to conceptualize mediality in general and media interrelations, particularly in relation to symbolicity. Informed by a multimodal view on media, the author provides a systematic overview of symbolicity within the context of communication among human minds structured around two crossing parameters: (...) symbols being limited or widespread among people and symbols not being part of or being part of systems – languages. Based on this overview, I clarify the role of culture in language notions and conceptualize language in relation to mediality. I also suggest a way of more precisely describing similarities and differences between languages and media types, without either conflating or totally separating the two concepts. Finally, I investigate how the dependence of language and media type conceptions on culture affects the idea of intermediality. Together, these investigations and conceptualizations promote a more comprehensive understanding of symbolicity in general and a deeper knowledge of the role of symbolicity in human communication, including verbal language, and intermedial relations involving all kinds of different media types. (shrink)

Critical Constructivism and postphenomenology are two possible ways of describing, analysing and evaluating the role and meaning of technology in contemporary society and world. Whereas Critical Constructivism looks at the way technologies are dealt with on a macro level considering systems and programs, then postphenomenology digs into the individual and personal appropriation and understanding of technology in everyday life. This means that there is a gap for what concerns levels, but also in relation to what they want to accomplish. The (...) critical stance of Andrew Feenberg in conceiving societal and political problems as ripe for radical technological change is met by postphenomenology’s pragmatic focus on how to build appropriate and meaningful structures for handling of emergent and imminent problems together with and through technology. This paper tries to bridge this gap by introducing the concept of scaffolding, which is inspired by Heidegger’s “Gestell,” but re-read in a new and different way than the usual pessimistic and deterministic interpretation where exploitation and “enframing” is at hand. Scaffolding is read as a common enterprise where we stretch and reach out towards each other in order to create platforms for interventions and activism. The paper is an attempt to direct this common enterprise in specific directions, and this directedness is indicative for our aims and goals. It is the claim that Critical Constructivism and postphenomenology should meet, and perform a certain kind of Techno-Activism when confronted with problems in technological society. (shrink)

Guided by the concept of bullshit, broadly defined as a deceptive form of rhetoric intended to distract and/or persuade, we examine how fabrications and false statements— when crafted and distributed by the president of the United States—impact not only foreign policy making and implementation but also erode democratic norms. Unconstrained by reality, and seemingly driven more by celebrity and showmanship than a genuine desire to govern, we argue that President Trump’s penchant for bullshit is part of a concerted strategy to (...) sideline critics while simultaneously undermining the ongoing investigations into the Trump campaign’s alleged collusion with the Russian government. (shrink)

Positive political theorists typically deny the possibility of collective agents by understanding aggregation problems to imply that groups are not rational decision-makers. This view contrasts with List and Pettit’s view that such problems actually imply the necessity of accounting for collective agents in explanations of group behaviour. In this paper, I explore these conflicting views and ask whether positive political theorists should alter their individualist analyses of groups like legislatures, political parties, and constituent assemblies. I show how we fail to (...) appreciate the significance of strategic voting and agenda control by treating groups as agents. I, therefore, conclude that positive political theorists should cling to their individualist approach and maintain that groups are not agents. (shrink)

Abstract Applied ethics is commonly carried out on the assumption that moral decisions can be handled by experts. This involves a failure to recognize that being morally serious means recognizing that one cannot hand over responsibility for certain decisions to anyone else. The idea of moral expertise is shown to be based on a misconstrual of the nature of moral discourse, one that can be overcome by following Wittgenstein's exhortation to philosophers to pay heed to the actual uses of language. (...) The sense of a moral judgment cannot be considered in isolation from what the speaker is doing in the context of utterance. The author concludes by suggesting that this discussion can provide the basis for a new reading of Anscombe's essay ?Modern Moral Philosophy? (shrink)